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CIVIL RIGHTS—EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: 
WHAT LEDBETTER MEANS FOR EMPLOYEES FACING 
GENDER-BASED PAY DISCRIMINATION 
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007) 
 
I. FACTS 
Lilly Ledbetter was employed by Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. in 
Gadsden, Alabama.1  Ledbetter worked as an area manager, supervising a 
group of tire builders.2  One of four business center managers supervised 
the area managers.3  Early each year, the business center managers recom-
mended salary increases for each of the salaried employees supervised, 
including the area managers.4  Each business center manager completed a 
worksheet, called a merit increase plan, using performance rankings and 
guidelines regarding the size and frequency of merit-based salary 
increases.5  These merit increase plans required approval from upper-level 
management before they went into effect.6 
Ledbetter began her career at the Gadsden plant in 1979, when she was 
forty years old.7  The plant laid her off twice, once in 1986 and again in 
1989.8  In 1992, Ledbetter began working in the Radial Light Truck section 
of the Tire Assembly business center, which produced radial tires for sport 
utility vehicles and light trucks.9  Her business center manager, Mike 
Tucker, consistently ranked her performance at or near the bottom of the 
employees he supervised.10 
In 1993, she was ranked third out of four area managers in her depart-
ment and fifth out of six salaried employees.11  That year, Tucker suggested 
that she receive a 5.28% salary increase, which was the largest increase 
among the area managers by percentage but the smallest in absolute 
 
1. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2165 (2007). 
2. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 421 F.3d 1169, 1172 (11th Cir. 2005). 
3. Id. at 1171. 
4. Id. at 1172. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. at 1173. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. 
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dollars.12  In 1994, Ledbetter was ranked last among area managers and 
salaried employees.13  She received a 5% salary increase, the smallest of 
any salaried employee.14  In 1995, however, Ledbetter earned a higher 
performance rating.15  She received an individual performance award and a 
top performance award, which resulted in a 7.85% salary increase.16  In 
1996, she was unable to receive a salary increase because of a time restric-
tion related to the date on which she received her 1995 increase.17  
However, her performance rankings were low once again.18  Tucker ranked 
her fifteenth out of sixteen area managers and twenty-third out of twenty-
four salaried employees.19 
In 1997, Ledbetter was making $3727 per month, which was 15% 
lower than the lowest paid male area manager and 40% lower than the 
highest paid male area manager.20  Her business center manager, Mike 
Tucker, was replaced by Kelly Owen.21  Owen ranked her performance as 
twenty-third out of twenty-four salaried employees and fifteenth out of 
sixteen area managers.  Owen denied her a raise.22 
Ledbetter complained of sexual harassment and sex discrimination.23  
Prior to 1998, she complained of treatment she received from a supervisor, 
Mike Maudsley.24  Ledbetter claimed that Maudsley threatened to give her 
a bad performance evaluation if she was not receptive to his sexual 
advances.25  Maudsley later allegedly falsified Ledbetter’s performance 
audits.26  Ledbetter continued to spurn Maudsley’s advances, and her 
evaluation rating became progressively worse.27  The audits conducted by 
Mike Maudsley were the basis of the denial of a raise for Ledbetter in 
 
12. Id.  Ledbetter’s increase was lowest in absolute dollars because the male area managers 
obtained higher salaries.  Id. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. at 1173-74. 
18. Id. at 1174. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 1175. 
23. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 4, Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 
2162 (2007) (No. 05-1074). 
24. Id. 
25. Id. at 16. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
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1997.28  Ledbetter believed these actions constituted unlawful discrimina-
tion on the basis of sex.29 
In 1998, Ledbetter took a non-supervisory position as a technology 
engineer.30  On March 25 of that year, she filed a questionnaire with the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), stating that she had 
received disparate treatment in her new department on account of her sex 
and had been forced to take a technology engineer position.31  In July of 
1998, she filed a formal discrimination charge with the EEOC, which 
included her earlier complaints, as well as a complaint that she had received 
a lower salary as an area manager on account of her sex.32 
In August of 1998, Goodyear announced that it would be downsizing 
the Gadsden plant and gave employees the option to choose early retirement 
rather than be laid off.33  Ledbetter opted for early retirement and retired on 
November 1, 1998.34  She filed suit against Goodyear over one year later.35 
On November 24, 1999, Ledbetter filed multiple claims in the Northern 
District of Alabama against Goodyear for violations of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, the Equal Pay Act (EPA), and the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act.36  The jury considered four claims, one of disparate 
pay based on gender and three of age discrimination related to her transfer 
to the Technology Engineer position.37  The jury found for Goodyear on the 
age discrimination claims and for Ledbetter on the disparate pay claim.38  
The court awarded Ledbetter $223,776 in back pay, $4662 for mental 
anguish, and $3,285,979 in punitive damages.39  The district court denied a 
motion for judgment as a matter of law from Goodyear, but reduced the 
jury award to $360,000, which consisted of $300,000 in compensatory and 
punitive damages and $60,000 in back pay, plus attorneys’ fees and costs.40  
Goodyear appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit.41 
 
28. Id. 
29. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 421 F.3d 1169, 1175 (11th Cir. 2005). 
30. Id. at 1174. 
31. Id. at 1175. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 1175 n.7 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(d), 621-34 (2000); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-
17 (2000)). 
37. Id. at 1175. 
38. Id. at 1175-76. 
39. Id. at 1176. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
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The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of judgment as 
a matter of law in favor of Goodyear.42  The Eleventh Circuit held that 
National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan43 governed the issue, and that 
Ledbetter’s disparate pay claim was a claim alleging a discrete act of 
discrimination.44  Because EEOC charges are time-sensitive, Ledbetter 
could only challenge discrete acts of discrimination that took place within 
180 days before the filing of her EEOC questionnaire on March 25, 1998.45  
The only pay decision during this period was Ledbetter’s denial of a raise 
by Kelly Owen, based on her 1997 performance review.46  The Eleventh 
Circuit found that no reasonable jury could find that this act was discrimi-
natory.47  The Eleventh Circuit rejected Ledbetter’s argument, holding that 
issuing paychecks based on prior discrimination does not constitute a 
continuing act of discrimination.48  Because the pay decisions that took 
place within 180 days before the filing of the EEOC questionnaire were not 
discriminatory, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed her complaint with 
prejudice.49 
Ledbetter then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the United 
States Supreme Court.50  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide 
whether a plaintiff could bring a Title VII pay discrimination claim when 
the disparate pay was received during the statutory charging period, but was 
the result of discriminatory pay decisions that were made outside the 
charging period.51  The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Ledbetter’s 
claims were time-barred.52 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Supreme Court considered Ledbetter’s claim under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964.53  Ledbetter analogized her Title VII claim to 
claims under a number of other statutes, including the Equal Pay Act 
 
42. Id. at 1189-90. 
43. 536 U.S. 101 (2002) [hereinafter Amtrak v. Morgan]. 
44. Ledbetter, 421 F.3d at 1179-80. 
45. Id. at 1178. 
46. Id. at 1180. 
47. Id. at 1184. 
48. Id. at 1182. 
49. Id. at 1189-90. 
50. Brief of Ledbetter at *8-9, Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 126 S. Ct. 2965 
(2006) (No. 05-1074), 2006 WL 448515. 
51. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 126 S. Ct. 2965, 2965 (2006), cert. granted, 
74 U.S.L.W. 3713 (June 26, 2006) (No. 05-1074). 
52. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2177 (2007). 
53. Id. at 2165. 
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(EPA), the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), and the National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA).54  A greater understanding of the statutes cited in 
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.55 may be helpful to understand 
the Court’s decision.56  The Supreme Court has also previously addressed 
legal concepts considered by the Ledbetter Court, including discrete acts of 
discrimination, unlawful employment practices, and the EEOC charging 
period.57  Knowledge of these decisions is essential to understanding the 
decision of the Ledbetter Court. 
A. TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 
On July 2, 1964, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964.58  The 
purpose of the act was: 
To enforce the constitutional right to vote, to confer jurisdiction 
upon the district courts of the United States to provide injunctive 
relief against discrimination in public accommodations, to author-
ize the Attorney General to institute suits to protect constitutional 
rights in public facilities and public education, to extend the 
Commission on Civil Rights, to prevent discrimination in federally 
assisted programs, to establish a Commission on Equal 
Employment Opportunity, and for other purposes.59 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 made employment discrimination 
on the basis of sex illegal, including discrimination related to compensa-
tion.60  Title VII also created the EEOC.61 
The EEOC is charged with investigating and redressing claims of 
employment discrimination.62  Title VII originally mandated that a charge 
of employment discrimination be filed with the EEOC within ninety days of 
its occurrence.63  If the employer has not complied with the EEOC’s efforts 
to end the discrimination within thirty days of the filing of an EEOC 
 
54. Id. at 2176-77. 
55. 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007). 
56. See Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2166-67 (discussing Title VII). 
57. See, e.g., Amtrak v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114 (2002) (listing discrete acts of discrim-
ination); Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 395-96 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring) (identifying 
each paycheck issued under a racially discriminatory system as an actionable instance of employ-
ment discrimination). 
58. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 241 (1964). 
59. Id. 
60. Id. § 703(a)(1), 78 Stat. at 255. 
61. Id. § 705, 78 Stat. at 258. 
62. Id. § 706(a), 78 Stat. at 259. 
63. Id. § 706(d), 78 Stat. at 260. 
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charge, the claimant may then file suit.64  In 1972, Title VII was amended to 
extend the 90 day filing period to 180 days.65  The Equal Employment 
Opportunity Act of 1972 also amended the Title VII section dealing with 
the remedies available to the EEOC.66  These remedies include enjoining 
the employer from engaging in the unlawful employment practice, rein-
stating the employee with or without back pay, and any other equitable 
relief the court sees fit.67  The time for which an employee can receive back 
pay is limited to two years before the filing of the charge with the EEOC.68  
Employee wages are also regulated by the FLSA.69 
B. THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT OF 1938 
The FLSA, passed as part of President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal 
legislation, was enacted on June 25, 1938.70  Its purpose was to establish 
“fair labor standards in employments in and affecting interstate com-
merce.”71  The FLSA regulates employee wages.72  The FLSA mandates the 
minimum wages employees must be paid and maximum hours that they 
may work.73  Unlike Title VII, employees seeking to state a claim under the 
FLSA face a two year statute of limitations.74  The FLSA did not originally 
bar gender-based pay discrimination, but it was later amended to do so.75 
C. THE EQUAL PAY ACT OF 1963 
Congress amended the FLSA when it passed the EPA on June 10, 
1963.76  Its purpose was to “prohibit discrimination on account of sex in the 
payment of wages by employers engaged in commerce or in the production 
of goods for commerce.”77  The EPA bars gender-based pay discrimina-
tion.78  The EPA prohibited employers engaged in interstate commerce 
 
64. Id. § 706(e), 78 Stat. at 260. 
65. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103, 105 
(1972).  The filing period is 300 days if there is a state agency that also has jurisdiction over the 
claim.  Id. 
66. Id. § 706(g), 86 Stat. at 107. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938). 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. 29 U.S.C. § 207 (2000). 
73. Id. 
74. Id. § 255. 
75. Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56, 56 (1963). 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
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from discriminating between employees on the basis of sex by paying 
employees of one sex lower wages than employees of the opposite sex for 
equal work.79  The EPA provided exceptions for differences in wages based 
on a seniority system, merit system, commission system, or a factor other 
than sex.80  Unlike Title VII, the EPA did not require that a claim be filed 
with an agency before action could be taken in court.81  Claims under the 
EPA do not face a statute of limitations as limited as claims under Title 
VII.82  Title VII bears more similarities to the NLRA.83 
D. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 
On July 5, 1935, Congress passed another piece of New Deal legisla-
tion, the NLRA.84  The purpose of the act was to “diminish the causes of 
labor burdening or obstructing interstate and foreign commerce” and to 
create the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).85  Similar to Title VII, 
the NLRA created an agency to address disputes between employers and 
employees.86  The NLRA granted employees the rights “to self-organiza-
tion, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively 
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted 
activities, for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or 
protection.”87  The NLRB is charged with effectuating these rights by 
promulgating rules and investigating and adjudicating disputes.88  Parties 
that are dissatisfied with the NLRB’s decision can appeal to the court of 
appeals of the circuit in which the unfair labor practice took place.89  
Besides adjudicating disputes over agency decisions, the courts have 
defined the parameters and procedures of challenges to unlawful 
employment acts.90 
 
79. Id. at 56-57. 
80. Id. at 57. 
81. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 260 (1964). 
82. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103, 105 
(1972) (mandating that claims be filed with the EEOC within 180 days); see also 29 U.S.C. 
§ 255(a) (2000) (mandating a two-year statute of limitations for violations, three years for willful 
violations). 
83. National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935). 
84. 49 Stat. at 449. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. § 3(a), 49 Stat. at 451; Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 258 
(1964). 
87. Id. § 7, 49 Stat. at 452. 
88. Id. §§ 6(a), 10(b), 11, 49 Stat. at 452, 453, 455-57. 
89. Id. §§ 10(e)-(f), 49 Stat. at 454-55. 
90. See, e.g., United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 554-55 (1977) (mandating that a 
charge be filed within ninety days). 
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E. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS DEFINING UNLAWFUL EMPLOYMENT 
PRACTICES AND APPLYING THE EEOC LIMITATIONS PERIOD 
The United States Supreme Court has played a role in defining how 
employment practices, including wage decisions, are regulated.91  The 
Court has decided when particular claims must be filed in order to comply 
with EEOC requirements.92  The Court has explained when the EEOC 
charging period begins to run.93  It has also defined exactly what does and 
does not constitute a discriminatory employment act.94  First, in United Air 
Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 95 the Court considered the EEOC charging period.96 
1. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans 
In Evans, an employee could not challenge a current denial of seniority 
based on a previous forced resignation.97  Evans was employed by United 
Air Lines (United) as a flight attendant.98  United forced her to resign in 
1968 because she got married, and at that time United had a policy against 
employing married flight attendants.99  This policy was later found to be 
unconstitutional by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, and United 
rehired Evans in 1972.100  However, United treated Evans as a new em-
ployee in terms of seniority and benefits.101  Evans filed suit against United, 
but the Supreme Court time-barred her claim.102  The Court held that the 
seniority system was not being operated in a discriminatory way.103  Also, 
Evans lost her opportunity to challenge her forced resignation in 1968 
because she did not file a charge with the EEOC within the ninety day time 
period.104  The fact that Evans still suffered the effects of her previous 
 
91. See id. (setting guidelines for filing an EEOC charge).   
92. Id. 
93. See Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258 (1980) (holding that the EEOC charging 
period began to run when the plaintiff was denied tenure, and not when he was terminated). 
94. See Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 395-96 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring) (includ-
ing the issuance of paychecks under a discriminatory wage system as a discriminatory 
employment act); see also Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 906 (1989) (holding that 
the adoption of discriminatory seniority rules may be challenged, but not the application of those 
rules). 
95. 431 U.S. 553 (1977). 
96. Evans, 431 U.S. at 554-55. 
97. Id. at 557. 
98. Id. at 554. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. at 554-55 (citing Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. 
denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971)). 
101. Id. at 555.  
102. Id. at 556-57. 
103. Id. at 555. 
104. Id. at 559. 
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forced resignation was irrelevant.105  The previous discrimination may pro-
vide useful background information, but it has no present legal effect.106  
Next, the Supreme Court decided when the EEOC charging period would 
begin.107 
2. Delaware State College v. Ricks 
In Delaware State College v. Ricks,108 the Court faced another 
distinction between a discriminatory act and its effects.109  Columbus Ricks, 
who emigrated from Liberia, was a professor at Delaware State College 
(DSC).110  DSC denied Ricks tenure in March of 1974.111  Instead, DSC 
offered him a one year “terminal” contract, which he signed on September 
4, 1974.112  Ricks failed to achieve redress through the internal grievance 
process and the state employment discrimination system.113  He then filed a 
charge with the EEOC on April 28, 1975, for discrimination on the basis of 
national origin.114 
In a decision that was later affirmed by the Supreme Court, the district 
court time-barred Ricks’s claim because he did not file a charge with the 
EEOC within 180 days of his denied tenure.115  Ricks argued that his termi-
nation on June 30, 1975, at the end of his “terminal” contract along with the 
denial of tenure, was a discriminatory act.116  The Court disagreed, how-
ever, concluding that the termination was merely an effect of the potentially 
discriminatory denial of tenure.117  The Court also concluded that the EEOC 
charging period begins to run when the discriminatory act takes place, not 
when its effects are suffered.118  Ricks’s Title VII claim was time-barred 
because he did not file an EEOC charge within 180 days of when the 
discriminatory act, the denial of tenure, took place.119  The Supreme Court 
next defined what constitutes a discriminatory employment act.120 
 
105. Id. at 558. 
106. Id. 
107. Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258 (1980). 
108. 449 U.S. 250 (1980). 
109. Ricks, 449 U.S. at 258. 
110. Id. at 252. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. at 253-54. 
113. Id. at 254. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. at 254-55. 
116. Id. at 257. 
117. Id. at 258. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 256. 
120. Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 395-96 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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3. Bazemore v. Friday 
In Bazemore v. Friday,121 employees of the North Carolina 
Agricultural Extension Service challenged race-based pay discrimination.122  
Before 1965, the Extension Service operated two branches: a “white 
branch” and a “Negro branch.”123  The African-American employees were 
paid less than the white employees.124  This pay disparity continued after 
the branches were combined in 1965.125  In 1972, Title VII was made 
applicable to state governments as employers.126  The Court held that even 
though the pre-1972 acts of discrimination were not actionable, liability 
could be imposed for discrimination that was perpetuated after 1972.127  
Justice Brennan explained, “[e]ach week’s paycheck that delivers less to a 
black than to a similarly situated white is a wrong actionable under Title 
VII, regardless of the fact that this pattern was begun prior to the effective 
date of Title VII.”128  Thus, even though the pay discrimination began 
before Title VII was applicable to the Extension Service, the discrimination 
that continued after 1972 was actionable.129  The Court later narrowed its 
view of actionable employment decisions.130 
4. Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc. 
In Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc.,131 employees challenged the 
provisions of a seniority system.132  Until 1979, all hourly workers at 
AT&T’s Montgomery Works plant earned seniority based on the number of 
years worked at the plant.133  A worker that was promoted to the position of 
“tester” retained the seniority she had previously earned.134  However, in 
1979 the company changed the rules for earning seniority.135  Under the 
new rules, testers earned seniority based on the amount of time in that 
 
121. 478 U.S. 385 (1986) (per curiam). 
122. Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 386 (per curiam). 
123. Id. at 394 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
124. Id. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. at 395. 
128. Id. at 395-96. 
129. Id. at 396. 
130. Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 906 (1989). 
131. 490 U.S. 900 (1989). 
132. Lorance, 490 U.S. at 902. 
133. Id. at 901. 
134. Id. at 902. 
135. Id. 
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position, not the amount of time worked at the plant.136  At that time, more 
women were being promoted to tester positions.137  The women that had 
recently been promoted alleged that the new seniority rules were 
discriminatory.138  Some female testers filed a complaint with the EEOC in 
1983.139  The Court time-barred the claim, because the adoption of the new 
seniority rules was the actionable employment act, and this took place 
outside the EEOC charging period.140  The Court thus rejected another 
claim of a continuing violation of Title VII.141 
Congress reacted to this decision.142  Congress amended Title VII in 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991.143  The amendment classified the following as 
unlawful employment practices: when a discriminatory seniority system is 
adopted, when an individual becomes subject to it, and when a person is 
injured by its application.144  This, in effect, overruled the Court’s holding 
in Lorance that only the adoption of the discriminatory seniority system 
could be challenged.145  Finally, the Court categorized discriminatory 
employment acts.146 
5. Amtrak v. Morgan 
In Amtrak v. Morgan, Abner Morgan, Jr., allegedly suffered discrimi-
nation when Amtrak refused to allow him to participate in an apprenticeship 
program, censured him for absenteeism, used racial epithets against him, 
and terminated him for refusing to follow orders.147  Morgan filed claims 
with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing and the 
EEOC, and sued Amtrak for violating Title VII.148  Morgan alleged that he 
suffered both discrete acts of discrimination and a hostile work environ-
ment.149  The Court held that when challenging a discrete act of discrimi-
nation, an EEOC charge must be filed within 180 or 300 days of the 
 
136. Id. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. at 903. 
139. Id. at 906. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. 
142. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-66, 105 Stat. 1071, 1078-79 (1991) 
(amending Title VII to include provisions related to discriminatory seniority systems). 
143. Id. 
144. 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e5(e)(2) (2008). 
145. Lorance, 490 U.S. at 906. 
146. Amtrak v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110, 115 (2002). 
147. Id. at 105-06 n.1. 
148. Id. at 104, 105. 
149. Id. at 104. 
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occurrence of the act.150  The proper charging period is easily determined 
because a discrete act occurs on a particular day.151  These discrete acts 
include such decisions as “termination, failure to promote, denial of trans-
fer, or refusal to hire.”152  A hostile environment, on the other hand, does 
not occur on any particular day.153  It can occur over a long period of time 
and can be comprised of a number of acts, not all of which are 
actionable.154 
When determining whether a hostile work environment exists, courts 
look at the totality of the circumstances, including the frequency of the 
conduct; the severity of the conduct; the degree of threat or humiliation; and 
whether the interference with the employee’s performance was unreason-
able.155  A hostile work environment is actionable as long as one of the acts 
that contributes to it takes place during the EEOC charging period.156  The 
Court also held that employers could use equitable doctrines such as 
waiver, estoppel, equitable tolling, and laches to combat a hostile work 
environment claim.157  The Court ultimately remanded Morgan’s claim for 
further proceedings.158  In a number of other cases, the Supreme Court 
described the elements necessary to make out a claim of disparate 
treatment.159 
F. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS DEFINING THE ELEMENTS OF A 
CLAIM OF DISPARATE TREATMENT 
The Court has stated that discriminatory intent is an essential element 
behind a claim of employment discrimination.160  In International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,161 African-American and Latino 
workers claimed that their employer and their union discriminated against 
them in hiring, promotion, wages, and seniority.162  The claim was a 
disparate treatment claim, that African-Americans and Latinos were treated 
 
150. Id. at 110.  The EEOC charge must be filed within 300 days if a state agency also has 
jurisdiction over the discrimination claim.  Id. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. at 114. 
153. Id. at 115. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. at 116. 
156. Id. at 117. 
157. Id. at 121. 
158. Id. at 122. 
159. See, e.g., Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) 
(explaining that “[p]roof of discriminatory motive is critical”). 
160. Id. 
161. 431 U.S. 324 (1977). 
162. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 329. 
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disparate from whites.163  According to the majority, this is “the most easily 
understood type of discrimination.”164  The employees had to prove that 
their employer and the union acted with the intent to discriminate.165  The 
majority contrasted disparate treatment claims with disparate impact 
claims.166  In a disparate impact claim, the claimant does not have to prove 
discriminatory intent.167  These claims “involve employment practices that 
are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall 
more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business 
necessity.”168  The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the appellate 
court’s decision for the employees.169 
In Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust,170 the Court considered another 
disparate treatment claim.171  An African-American bank employee filed a 
discrimination claim after being rejected for several promotions.172  The 
Court held that to make out such a claim, the employee had to prove that 
her employer intended to discriminate.173  The appellate court’s decision 
was reversed and remanded.174  The district court was directed to review 
statistical evidence of discrimination to consider the employee’s claim 
under disparate impact theory.175 
Thus, in the line of cases preceding Ledbetter, the Supreme Court 
decided that an EEOC charge must be filed within the statutory limitations 
period following the date of the act itself, not when its effects were 
suffered.176  An actionable discriminatory employment act can be described 
as either a discrete act, which occurs on a particular day, or a hostile work 
environment, which occurs over a period of time.177  Discriminatory pay 
has been treated somewhat differently, with each paycheck issued under a 
discriminatory pay system beginning its own EEOC charging period.178 
 
163. Id. at 335. 
164. Id. at 335 n.15. 
165. Id. (citing Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977)). 
166. Id. at 336 n.15. 
167. Id. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. at 376-77. 
170. 487 U.S. 977 (1988). 
171. Watson, 487 U.S. at 984. 
172. Id. at 982. 
173. Id. at 986 (citing Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15). 
174. Id. at 1000. 
175. Id. at 999-1000. 
176. Lorance v. AT&T Techs. Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 906 (1989); Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 
U.S. 250, 258 (1980); United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553,  559 (1977). 
177. Amtrak v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110, 115 (2002). 
178. Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 395-96 (1986) (Brennan, J. concurring). 
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III. ANALYSIS 
In Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Justice Alito wrote the 
majority opinion for a closely divided Court, joined by Chief Justice 
Roberts, Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas.179  The majority held that 
nondiscriminatory acts, such as issuing a paycheck that put prior discrimi-
natory pay decisions into effect, do not begin a new EEOC charging 
period.180  Thus, Ledbetter’s claims were not timely.181  Justice Ginsburg 
wrote a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, 
and Breyer.182 
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION 
The question before the Court was: 
Whether and under what circumstances a plaintiff may bring an 
action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 alleging 
illegal pay discrimination when the disparate pay is received dur-
ing the statutory limitations period, but is the result of intentionally 
discriminatory pay decisions that occurred outside the limitations 
period.183 
To answer this question, the majority cited Evans, Ricks, and Lorance for 
the proposition that an EEOC charging period begins when the discrete act 
of discrimination occurs, not when the effects of this act are felt.184  In 
addition, a discriminatory act requires not only disparate impact, but also 
discriminatory intent.185  Because the allegedly discriminatory pay 
decisions took place outside of the EEOC charging period, Ledbetter’s 
claims were time-barred.186  In making its decision, the majority first dis-
cussed whether the discriminatory intent behind one act can be imputed to a 
later act.187  Next, it examined whether pay decisions should be treated 
 
179. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2165 (2007). 
180. Id. at 2170 (citing Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258 (1980)). 
181. Id. at 2172 (citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 109). 
182. Id. at 2165. 
183. Brief of Ledbetter at *i, Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 26 S. Ct. 2965 
(2006) (No. 05-1074), 2006 WL 448515.  See Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2166 (listing the questions 
before the Court). 
184. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2167-69 (citing Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 
902-03, 905, 907-08, 911 (1989); Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 252-54, 257-58 (1980); 
United Air Lines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 554-55, 557-58 (1977)). 
185. Id. at 2171. 
186. Id. at 2172 (citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 109). 
187. Id. at 2167-68 (citing Evans, 431 U.S. at 557-58). 
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differently from other employment actions under Title VII.188  Finally, the 
majority discussed Ledbetter’s policy arguments and analogies to other 
statutes.189 
1. Prior Discriminatory Intent Cannot be Imputed to a 
Subsequent Act 
The majority reiterated Title VII’s requirements that to challenge 
employment discrimination on the basis of sex, a charge must be filed with 
the EEOC within 180 days of the discriminatory act.190  If a charge is not 
filed with the EEOC during this time period, then the discriminatory act 
cannot be challenged in court.191  The first step in analyzing an employment 
discrimination claim is to specifically identify the employment practices in 
question.192   
Ledbetter asserted that each of the paychecks she was issued during the 
180 days prior to the filing of her charge with the EEOC constituted a 
separate act of discrimination.193  She also argued that the 1998 decision to 
deny her a raise was discriminatory because it propagated a pay disparity 
that was based on prior discriminatory acts.194  The majority asserted that 
these acts lack the “central element” of disparate treatment, however, which 
is discriminatory intent.195  It also rejected Ledbetter’s contention that prior 
discrimination can be “carried forward” by later non-discriminatory acts 
that cause the employee to suffer the effects of the prior discrimination.196  
In making this determination, the majority found the Court’s prior decisions 
in Evans, Ricks, and Lorance instructive.197 
The plaintiffs in Evans, Ricks, and Lorance argued that because they 
suffered discrimination during the EEOC charging period, their claims were 
timely.198  The Ledbetter Court disagreed and rejected such “continuing 
 
188. Id. at 2172.  See Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 386-87 (1986) (holding that pay 
discrimination that took place before the EEOC charging period could be challenged). 
189. See Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2176-77 (discussing analogies to other statutes). 
190. Id. at 2166 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1), 2000e-5(e)(1) ((2000)). 
191. Id. at 2166-67 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2000)). 
192. Id. at 2167 (citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 110-11). 
193. Id. 
194. Id. 
195. Id. (citing Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 1002 (1998); Chardon v. 
Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 8 (1981); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 
(1977)). 
196. Id. at 2169 (citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113). 
197. Id. at 2167-68 (citing Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 907-08 (1989); Del. 
State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258 (1980); United Air Lines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558 
(1977)). 
198. Id. (citing Lorance, 490 U.S. at 906; Ricks, 449 U.S. at 257; Evans, 431 U.S. at 577-78). 
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discrimination” arguments in each case.199  In Evans, the discriminatory 
intent behind the plaintiff’s termination, which took place prior to the 
EEOC charging period, could not be imputed to her denial of seniority.200  
In Ricks, the discriminatory intent behind the denial of the plaintiff’s tenure 
could not be carried over to his termination.201  In Lorance, the discrimina-
tory intent behind the adoption of a new seniority system could not be 
connected to benefits that were issued during the EEOC charging period.202  
These decisions show that the proper inquiry in deciding whether an 
employment discrimination claim has been timely filed is not when the 
effects of discrimination were felt, but when the intentionally discrimi-
natory act took place.203 
The majority then looked to a more recent case, Morgan, to determine 
what may constitute a discriminatory act in regard to employment.204  A 
discrete act that can be challenged as discriminatory is a “single ‘occur-
rence’ that takes place at a particular point in time,” such as “termination, 
failure to promote, denial of transfer, and refusal to hire.”205  Ledbetter 
never claimed that any such discriminatory employment act occurred during 
the 180 days prior to the filing of her EEOC charge, including her denial of 
a raise in 1998.206  The majority objected to Ledbetter’s attempt to impute 
the alleged discriminatory intent associated with prior pay decisions to the 
1998 decision.207  Allowing this transferring of intent would impose 
liability without the presence of the essential element of discriminatory 
intent.208  This would eliminate discriminatory intent as an element of a 
disparate treatment claim.209  The majority did not remove this element, nor 
would it circumvent the statutory limitation period chosen by Congress 
when it enacted Title VII.210 
The 180 day charging period required by Title VII serves a policy of 
repose.211  It protects employers from having to defend against discrimina-
tion claims regarding decisions that were made in the past, perhaps after the 
 
199. Id. 
200. Id. (citing Evans, 431 U.S. at 578). 
201. Id. at 2168 (citing Ricks, 449 U.S. at 257). 
202. Id. (citing Lorance, 490 U.S. at 906). 
203. Id. at 2169 (citing Lorance, 490 U.S. at 906; Ricks, 449 U.S. at 257; Evans, 431 U.S. at 
577-78). 
204. Id. 
205. Id. (citing Amtrak v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110-11, 114 (2002)). 
206. Id. 
207. Id. at 2170. 
208. Id. 
209. Id. 
210. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5-(e)(1) (2000)). 
211. Id. (citing Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554-55 (1974)). 
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departure of those that made the decisions.212  The discriminatory intent 
element of a disparate pay claim makes timely filing all the more crucial.213  
The intent of the employer will often, if not always, be the most disputed 
element of the claim.214  Evidence of intent is likely to disappear quickly as 
witnesses become unavailable and memories fade.215  The majority asserted 
that Congress intentionally chose a short deadline, and the Court will give 
deference to this legislative decision.216  The fact that Congress chose such 
a short deadline refuted Ledbetter’s argument that the doctrine of laches 
provides proper protection to employers.217  Congress did not force 
employers to rely on this doctrine, but instead instituted a short deadline for 
the filing of claims.218 
The majority held that Evans, Ricks, Lorance, and Morgan con-
trolled.219  The Ledbetter Court rejected Ledbetter’s assertion that an 
employment practice committed with no improper purpose and no discrimi-
natory intent is still unlawful because it gives some effect to an intentional 
discriminatory act that occurred before the charging period.220  The majority 
ruled that Ledbetter’s disparate pay claim was untimely for these reasons.221  
The majority then turned to Ledbetter’s argument that Bazemore v. Friday 
is controlling and that the “paycheck accrual rule” should be used in this 
case.222 
2. Pay Decisions Are Not to Be Treated Differently Than Other 
Employment Decisions 
Ledbetter argued that Bazemore, not Evans, Ricks, and Lorance should 
be controlling in this case and that pay decisions should be treated differ-
ently than other employment decisions.223  She argued that the Bazemore 
Court held that each paycheck begins a new EEOC charging period that 
allows any prior discriminatory conduct that affected the amount of the 
 
212. Id. (citing Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 256-57 (1980)). 
213. Id. at 2171. 
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215. Id. 
216. Id. at 2170. 
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220. Id. (citing Amtrak v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 109 (2002); Int’l Union of Elec., Radio, & 
Machine Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229, 236 (1976)). 
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223. Id. (citing Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 395 (1986)). 
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paycheck to be challenged.224  This is called the “paycheck accrual rule.”225  
However, the majority disagreed with this interpretation.226  According to 
the majority, Bazemore is inapposite to this case because it dealt with an 
amendment to Title VII.227  In 1972, Title VII was made applicable to pub-
lic employees, like the plaintiffs in Bazemore.228  Justice Brennan, in his 
concurring opinion, asserted that pre-1972 acts of discrimination that were 
perpetuated after 1972 could be challenged.229  Bazemore dealt with a 
discriminatory pay structure.230  Thus, each paycheck issued under a 
discriminatory pay structure constitutes a new Title VII violation with its 
own EEOC charging period.231  Ledbetter’s situation is different than the 
plaintiffs’ in Bazemore.232  Ledbetter did not claim that Goodyear ever 
instituted a discriminatory pay structure.233  She only argued that particular 
Goodyear employees discriminated against her individually, but those 
alleged incidents took place outside of the EEOC charging period.234  
According to the majority, Bazemore did not support Ledbetter’s claim.235  
The majority then turned to Justice Ginsburg’s contention that Ledbetter’s 
pay discrimination claim should be treated differently than other disparate 
impact claims.236 
In contrast with the majority’s reasoning, Justice Ginsburg asserted in 
her dissent that Ledbetter’s disparate pay claim did not deal with a discrete 
act of discrimination, but with a hostile work environment.237  Morgan 
stated that a discrete act of discrimination is one that “constitutes a separate 
actionable ‘unlawful employment practice’ and that is temporally dis-
tinct.”238  Discrete acts include termination, failure to promote, denial of 
transfer, or refusal to hire.239  A hostile work environment is comprised of a 
 
224. Id. 
225. Id. 
226. Id. 
227. Id. 
228. Id. (citing Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 391).  This amendment allowed government 
employees to file employment discrimination claims following the same procedures as employees 
of private companies.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (2000).  
229. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2173 (citing Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 395 (Brennan, J., con-
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230. Id. at 2172 (citing Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 397 n.6 (Brennan, J., concurring)). 
231. Id. at 2174. 
232. Id. 
233. Id. 
234. Id. 
235. Id. 
236. Id. at 2175. 
237. Id. at 2181 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
238. Id. at 2175 (citing Amtrak v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114 (2002)). 
239. Id. (citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114). 
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number of harassing acts which may not be actionable individually.240  A 
hostile work environment does not occur on any specific day.241  The 
majority objected to this characterization of Ledbetter’s claim, however, 
pointing out that she asserted a claim against each paycheck she received 
during the EEOC charging period as a discrete discriminatory act.242  The 
majority rejected what it claimed to be Justice Ginsburg’s attempt to create 
a special rule for pay discrimination claims such as Ledbetter’s.243  Next, 
the majority rejected Ledbetter’s remaining arguments for the “paycheck 
accrual rule.”244 
3. Analogies to Other Statutes and Policy Arguments Are 
Insufficient to Support the “Paycheck Accrual Rule” 
The EPA prohibits paying unequal wages for equal work on the basis 
of sex.245  Ledbetter argued that because the EPA allows claims challenging 
discriminatory acts outside the EEOC limitations period, the Court should 
also allow such challenges under Title VII.246  The majority summarily 
dismissed this argument, stating that the EPA and Title VII are not the 
same.247  Particularly, the EPA does not require the filing of a charge with 
an administrative agency, as Title VII does.248  The EPA also does not 
require proof of intentional discrimination.249  The majority then considered 
Ledbetter’s analogy to the FLSA.250 
Ledbetter similarly argued that because the statute of limitations for 
violations of FLSA’s minimum wage and overtime provisions begins to run 
with each paycheck, so should the limitations period under Title VII.251  
The majority dismissed this argument just as quickly as it dismissed the 
EPA analogy.252  The majority explained that an FLSA minimum wage or 
overtime claim does not require proof of discriminatory intent.253  The 
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majority took a more favorable view to Ledbetter’s analogy to the 
NLRA.254 
The NLRA bears more similarity to Title VII than the EPA or the 
FLSA.255  Similar to Title VII, it requires the filing of a charge with an 
administrative agency (the National Labor Relations Board).256  Because 
the NLRA’s statute of limitations begins to run with each new paycheck, 
Ledbetter argued that Title VII’s limitations period should be similarly 
considered.257  However, the majority countered, the rule under NLRA is 
similar to the rule under Title VII.258  Claimants under the NLRA cannot 
challenge acts that took place prior to its six-month statute of limitations, 
just as claimants under Title VII cannot challenge acts that took place prior 
to the 180 day EEOC charging period.259  Ledbetter’s analogy to the NLRA 
did not support her claim, similar to her analogies to the EPA and the 
FLSA.260  The majority then confronted Ledbetter’s policy argument in 
favor of the “paycheck accrual rule.”261 
Ledbetter argued that plaintiffs asserting a claim of pay discrimination 
should have more time to file a charge with the EEOC than that mandated 
by the statute, because pay discrimination is more difficult to detect than 
other forms of discrimination.262  The majority was not swayed by this 
argument, however, and refused to address the issue.263  The majority found 
no support for Ledbetter’s policy argument in statutes or case law.264  As 
Justice Alito stated in the majority opinion: “We apply the statute as 
written, and this means that any unlawful employment practice, including 
those involving compensation, must be presented to the EEOC within the 
period prescribed by statute.”265  Thus, the majority rejected Ledbetter’s 
final argument.266 
The Ledbetter Court deemed Ledbetter’s claim to be time-barred.267  It 
found that an allegedly discriminatory act must be accompanied by 
discriminatory intent, and Ledbetter conceded that the only pay decisions 
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that took place during the 180 day EEOC charging period were not coupled 
with any discriminatory intent.268  The Court also refused to adopt the “pay-
check accrual rule” and held that the discriminatory intent accompanying an 
act outside the EEOC charging period cannot be carried forward and 
attached to an act within the period.269  The majority rejected Ledbetter’s 
analogies to other statutes and her policy arguments as well.270  The 
Supreme Court ultimately upheld the decision of the Court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit.271  The decision was split, however, with Justice 
Ginsburg writing a dissent joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and 
Breyer.272 
B. JUSTICE GINSBURG’S DISSENTING OPINION, JOINED BY JUSTICES 
STEVENS, SOUTER, AND BREYER 
Justice Ginsburg asserted that the majority erred in a number of 
respects.273  First, the majority should not have rejected the “paycheck 
accrual rule.”274  Second, the majority failed to recognize that pay discrimi-
nation is difficult to detect.275  Finally, it mistakenly relied on Evans, Ricks, 
and Lorance as controlling precedent.276  Ginsburg first turned to the 
question of what constitutes an unlawful employment practice under Title 
VII.277 
1. Unlawful Employment Practices Under Title VII 
Justice Ginsburg explained that in a pay discrimination claim, there are 
a number of ways to define the crucial employment practice.278  One view 
is that each wage-setting decision stands alone as a singular employment 
practice.279  If this is the case, each wage-setting decision must be chal-
lenged within its own 180 day EEOC charging period.280  An alternative 
view is that the wage-setting decision and the issuing of a paycheck with a 
discriminatorily low wage are both potentially unlawful employment 
 
268. Id. at 2167. 
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practices.281  Under this view, each paycheck would be actionable, with its 
own 180 day charging period.282  While prior discriminatory wage-setting 
decisions would not be actionable in and of themselves, they would be 
relevant in any claim related to the issuing of a discriminatory paycheck.283  
The majority followed the first view, but Justice Ginsburg contended that 
the second view is “more faithful to precedent, more in tune with the 
realities of the workplace, and more respectful of Title VII’s remedial 
purpose.”284 
a. Categories of Unlawful Practices 
Justice Ginsburg cited Bazemore as holding that paychecks based on 
past discrimination are actionable not only because they are related to prior 
discrimination, but because each paycheck is an instance of new discrimina-
tion.285  This view was refined in Morgan, where two categories of employ-
ment practices were defined: discrete acts and hostile work environ-
ments.286  Discrete acts, such as termination, failure to promote, denial of 
transfer, or refusal to hire, occur on a specific date.287  An EEOC charge 
must be filed within 180 days of the date on which the discrete act occurred 
in order to challenge the act in court.288  A hostile work environment does 
not occur on any particular day.289  The acts constituting a hostile work 
environment can take place over an extended period of time and may not be 
individually actionable.290  Justice Ginsburg asserted that the pay discrimi-
nation of the type suffered by Ledbetter is more similar to a hostile work 
environment than a single discrete act of discrimination.291  Ledbetter 
alleged, and the jury agreed, that a number of acts combined to result in the 
receipt of a discriminatorily low wage when compared to her male counter-
parts.292  Also, the realities of the workplace make Ledbetter’s claim similar 
to a hostile work environment claim.293 
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285. Id. at 2180 (citing Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 395-96 (1986)). 
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b. The Realities of the Workplace 
In a section of Justice Ginsburg’s dissent based more on practical 
reality than statutes and precedent, she explained that the nature of the 
workplace makes a pay discrimination claim more similar to a hostile work 
environment claim than one of a discrete discriminatory act.294  Often, an 
employee does not know that her pay is lower than that of her coworkers.295  
This problem is exacerbated when, as in Ledbetter’s case, the employee that 
is being discriminated against still receives raises, but the raises are lower 
than those of her male counterparts.296  She has little reason to investigate 
whether she has been discriminated against if she has received a raise.297  In 
addition, even if an employee is aware of a discrepancy between her pay 
and that of her coworkers, she may consider the amount not significant 
enough to complain or file a charge.298 
On the other hand, Justice Ginsburg asserted that an employee is fully 
aware of a discrete discriminatory act when it occurs.299  An employee who 
is fired or turned down for a promotion may immediately inquire into the 
reasons behind the decision.300  If she thinks those decisions are accom-
panied by discriminatory intent, she can challenge the decisions, whether 
through internal processes or the EEOC.301  Discrete acts of discrimination 
are different from a hostile work environment not only in the experience of 
the employee, but also in the effect on the employer.302 
c. The Benefits of Discrimination for Employers 
Justice Ginsburg further asserted that employers benefit differently 
from discrete acts of discrimination than they do from recurring pay 
discrimination.303  When an employer chooses to hire a man instead of a 
woman, a position is still filled with an employee to whom a salary must be 
paid, and benefits must possibly be given, for example.304  The same is true 
when a man is promoted or transferred instead of a woman.305  However, 
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when an employer intentionally pays a woman less than a man because of 
her sex, the business benefits by saving money on wages.306  Because of 
these differences, Justice Ginsburg stated that a pay discrimination claim 
such as Ledbetter’s should not be treated as a discrete act of discrimina-
tion.307  Accordingly, the precedent on which the majority relies is 
inapposite.308 
2. The Majority’s Reliance on Evans, Ricks, and Lorance is 
Unsound 
The majority relied heavily on Evans, Ricks, and Lorance to assert the 
point that an EEOC charge needs to be filed within 180 days of when the 
discriminatory act takes place, not when its effects are felt.309  Justice 
Ginsburg contended, however, that these cases are inapposite.310  Evans did 
not object to being forced to resign until four years later, when her seniority 
credit was denied.311  Ricks did not object to the denial of his tenure until 
one year later, when his terminal contract ended.312  These were easily 
identifiable singular acts of discrimination; not recurring, continuous 
discriminatory situations as in Ledbetter.313  Justice Ginsburg explained that 
Lorance is similarly inapplicable because its facts are dissimilar to 
Ledbetter, and it has been largely overruled through legislation.314 
The Lorance Court held that the adoption of the discriminatory 
seniority system was a discrete act of discrimination that had to be chal-
lenged within the EEOC charging period.315  In that sense, it is different 
from the recurring, hostile work environment-style discrimination of 
Ledbetter, and therefore distinguishable.316  Justice Ginsburg also stated 
that the majority’s reliance on Lorance is “perplexing,” since that decision 
was superseded by the 1991 Civil Rights Act.317  Congress followed the 
Lorance dissenters and amended Title VII to state that an actionable dis-
criminatory employment act occurs when a discriminatory seniority system 
 
306. Id. 
307. Id. 
308. Id. 
309. Id. at 2167-69 (citing Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 906 (1989); Del. 
State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258 (1980); United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 555, 
559 (1977)). 
310. Id. at 2182. 
311. Id. (citing Evans, 431 U.S. at 554-57). 
312. Id. (citing Ricks, 449 U.S. at 253-54, 257-58). 
313. Id. 
314. Id. at 2183 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(2) (2000); Lorance, 490 U.S. at 902, 905). 
315. Id. (citing Lorance, 490 U.S. at 914). 
316. Id. 
317. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(2) (2000)). 
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is adopted, when someone becomes subject to that system, and when 
someone is injured by that system.318  Lorance’s lack of precedential value 
is clarified by the fact that the Supreme Court had not, until Ledbetter, 
relied on it since the adoption of the 1991 Civil Rights Act.319  Thus, not 
only is the majority’s reasoning based on inapplicable precedent, it also 
defies the intent behind Title VII, according to Justice Ginsburg.320 
3. Title VII’s Backpay Provision 
Justice Ginsburg asserted that Congress never intended for the 180 day 
EEOC charging period to limit the employment acts that could be con-
sidered.321  Title VII allows damages to include backpay for a period of up 
to two years prior to the date that the charge is filed.322  According to 
Justice Ginsburg, this provision shows that Congress contemplated chal-
lenges to pay discrimination that began before the 180 day charging 
period.323  As the Morgan Court stated: 
If Congress intended to limit liability to conduct occurring in the 
period within which the party must file the charge, it seems un-
likely that Congress would have allowed recovery for two years of 
backpay.  And the fact that Congress expressly limited the amount 
of recoverable damages elsewhere to a particular time period 
indicates that the timely filing provision was not meant to serve as 
a specific limitation either on damages or the conduct that may be 
considered for the purposes of one actionable hostile work 
environment claim.324 
According to Justice Ginsburg, the Court should not have “immunize[d] 
forever discriminatory pay differentials unchallenged within 180 days of 
their adoption.”325  Justice Ginsburg next turned to the concerns of em-
ployers defending against claims of gender-based pay discrimination.326 
 
318. Id. 
319. Id. at 2184. 
320. Id. 
321. Id. 
322. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (2000)). 
323. Id. 
324. Amtrak v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 119 (2002). 
325. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2184. 
326. Id. at 2185-86. 
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4. Protections for Employers 
Justice Ginsburg disagreed with the majority’s assertion that its 
decision was necessary to protect employers from the need to defend 
against claims of pay discrimination based on decisions made long ago.327  
The discrimination suffered by Ledbetter did not take place long ago.328  
She suffered discrimination each time she received a lower paycheck 
because of her gender.329  Also, there are many defenses employers can use 
in response to these claims.330  Employers that are disadvantaged by a delay 
in bringing a claim can assert the defenses of waiver, estoppel, and 
equitable tolling.331  Moreover, the equitable doctrine of laches may help 
employers.332  Justice Ginsburg also took issue with the majority’s assertion 
that she would allow a pay discrimination claim based on a decision made 
twenty years ago.333  No reasonable judge would allow that claim, accord-
ing to Justice Ginsburg.334  In addition, an adequate defense against such a 
claim would be provided to any of the above-mentioned doctrines.335  
Finally, Justice Ginsburg looked at the simple facts to show how the 
majority had come to a decision in opposition to Title VII’s remedial 
purpose.336 
5. Ledbetter Proved That She Had Suffered Discrimination 
Justice Ginsburg reiterated that at trial, Ledbetter proved that she was a 
member of a protected class, that she had performed work equal to her male 
coworkers, that she had been paid less for that work, and that the pay 
disparity was due to gender-based discrimination.337  Ledbetter showed that 
she had suffered a long history of discrimination.338  She also introduced 
evidence to show that discrimination against women was pervasive at the 
 
327. Id. at 2170, 2185. 
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Gadsden, Alabama Goodyear plant.339  However, according to the majority, 
Title VII provides no remedy for this discrimination.340  Ledbetter had to 
challenge each and every pay decision within 180 days of when it was 
made.341  It is not unlawful to knowingly carry forward past discrimina-
tion.342  Ledbetter could not receive any compensation for her discrimi-
natorily low pay, nor could she—if she were still employed by Goodyear—
receive an injunction forcing the company to stop discriminating against 
her.343  Justice Ginsburg asserted that this result is contrary to Congress’s 
intent to enact protection against workplace discrimination through Title 
VII.344  For this reason and those described above, Justice Ginsburg would 
have reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
and held that Ledbetter’s claim was not time-barred.345 
IV. IMPACT 
Justice Ginsburg foreshadowed the impact of this decision when she 
asserted, “[o]nce again, the ball is in Congress’ court.  As in 1991, the 
Legislature may act to correct this Court’s parsimonious reading of Title 
VII.”346  Although the decision has received a somewhat favorable reaction 
in the lower courts,347 it appears that Congress is acting to reverse the 
Ledbetter Court’s ruling.348 
A. POSITIVE REACTION FROM LOWER COURTS 
The Court’s decision in Ledbetter has been followed in decisions by 
courts in the Second,349 Third,350 Fifth,351 Sixth,352 Seventh,353 Ninth,354 
 
339. Id. 
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342. Id. at 2187-88. 
343. Id. at 2188. 
344. Id. 
345. Id. 
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347. See, e.g., Plant v. Deutsche Bank Secs., Inc., 07 Civ. 3498 (AKH), 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 55100, at *5-10 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2007) (holding that a claim of a continuing violation of 
Title VII is untenable after Ledbetter).  But see Fed. Ins. Co. v. Albertson’s, Inc., No. C 06-04000 
MHP, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67791, at *8 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (explaining that Ledbetter merely 
classified discriminatory pay decisions as discrete acts, as opposed to a hostile work environment). 
348. See Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, H.R. 2831, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007) (proposing to 
codify the paycheck accrual rule). 
349. See, e.g., Plant, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55100, at *5-10 (rejecting a claim of a 
continuing violation of Title VII). 
350. See, e.g., Mikula v. Allegheny County of Pa., No. 06cv1630, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
70510, at *7-9 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 2007) (rejecting a Title VII claim because the EEOC charge 
was filed too late). 
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Tenth,355 and Eleventh356 Circuits.  Ledbetter has been cited for three rea-
sons.357  First, Ledbetter has been cited for its distinction between discrete 
acts of discrimination and continuing acts of discrimination.358  Courts have 
used Ledbetter to reject claims of violations of Title VII that cannot be 
fixed at one point in time.359  Second, Ledbetter has been cited for the 
proposition that nondiscriminatory employment acts do not violate Title 
VII, even if they put into effect discriminatory acts outside of the EEOC 
charging period.360  Plaintiffs have not been allowed to carry forward past 
discriminatory intent to a later employment act.361  This has also been 
phrased as a rejection of the “paycheck accrual rule,” which contends that 
each paycheck that is lower because of a past discriminatory act is action-
able under Title VII.362  Third, the Ledbetter decision has been used to bar 
claims of employment discrimination because charges were not timely 
filed.363  In addition to these three implications of Ledbetter, the decision 
has also affected how gender-based discrimination claims are made.364 
 
351. See, e.g., Smith v. Murphy & Sons, Inc., No. 2:06cv79, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64063, 
at *29 (N.D. Miss. Aug. 28, 2007) (considering a claim under the Equal Pay Act because the Title 
VII claim was time-barred). 
352. See, e.g., Algie v. N. Ky. Univ., No. 06-23-JGW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53347, at *13-
19 (E.D. Ky. July 23, 2007) (granting summary judgment because no discriminatory acts took 
place during the EEOC charging period). 
353. See, e.g., Groesch v. City of Springfield, No. 04-3162, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50009, at 
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356. See, e.g., Dixon v. Winter, No. 3:05-cv-1153-J-33HTS, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58539, 
at *7-8 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 10, 2007) (failing to consider a discrete act that took place outside of the 
EEOC charging period). 
357. Infra notes 358-62 and accompanying text. 
358. See, e.g., Plant v. Deutsche Bank Secs., Inc., 07 Civ. 3498 (AKH), 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 55100, at *6-8 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2007) (holding that a claim of a continuing violation of 
Title VII is untenable after Ledbetter). 
359. Id. 
360. See, e.g., Garcia v. Brockway, 503 F.3d 1092, 1098 (9th Cir. 2007) (granting rehearing 
en banc, and withdrawing opinion by Garcia v. Brockway, No. 05-35647, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 199 
(9th Cir. Idaho, Jan. 7, 2008)). 
361. Infra note 362 and accompanying text. 
362. See, e.g., Groesch v. City of Springfield, No. 04-3162, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50009, at 
*6-7 (C.D. Ill. July 11, 2007) (rejecting the “paycheck accrual rule”). 
363. See, e.g., Algie v. N. Ky. Univ., No. 06-23-JGW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53347, at *13 
(E.D. Ky. July 23, 2007) (granting summary judgment because the claim was not timely filed). 
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B. A SHIFT FROM TITLE VII TO THE EQUAL PAY ACT 
Ledbetter may have signaled a change in the significance of Title VII 
as it relates to pay discrimination claims based on gender.365  In Smith v. 
Murphy & Sons, Inc.,366 the District Court for the Northern District of 
Mississippi, after time-barring the plaintiff’s Title VII claim under 
Ledbetter, still considered the claim under the EPA, which has a two year 
statute of limitations.367  Justice Ginsburg foreshadowed this result in her 
dissent, stating, “[I]n truncating the Title VII rule this Court announced in 
Bazemore, the Court does not disarm female workers from achieving 
redress for unequal pay, but it does impede racial and other minorities from 
gaining similar relief,” because the EPA covers only gender-based discrimi-
nation.368  Thus, while Ledbetter may not preclude remedies for pay dis-
crimination based on gender, it may have a negative effect on minorities 
who cannot rely on the protection of the EPA.369 
C. NEGATIVE REACTION FROM LOWER COURTS 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Ledbetter has received negative 
treatment from courts in the Second,370 Third,371 Sixth,372 Eighth,373 
Ninth,374 and Tenth375 Circuits and the D.C. Circuit.376  Courts have not 
 
365. See Smith v. Murphy & Sons, Inc., No. 2:06cv79, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64063, at *29 
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discovery rule). 
372. See, e.g., Dodd v. Dyke Indus., No. 3:04-cv-226-H, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78248, at 
*13-14 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 19, 2007) (distinguishing Ledbetter because the plaintiff claimed that new 
and discrete discriminatory acts took place each year). 
373. See, e.g., Bearden v. Int’l Paper Co., No. 5:06cv0037, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69117, at 
*32-33 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 17, 2007) (considering the plaintiff’s claim only under the Equal Pay 
Act). 
374. See, e.g., Fed. Ins. Co. v. Albertson’s, Inc., No. C06-0400 MHP, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
67791, at *10-11 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2007) (concluding that Ledbetter did not directly address the 
equitable doctrine of continuing violations). 
375. See, e.g., Proctor v. UPS, 502 F.3d 1200, 1206-07 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding Ledbetter 
inapposite because it only dealt with discriminatory acts that took place outside the EEOC 
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refused to follow Ledbetter, but they have found opportunities to 
distinguish it.377  The decision has been distinguished when plaintiffs make 
pay discrimination claims under the Equal Pay Act instead of Title VII.378  
Ledbetter is inapplicable to claims that allege discriminatory acts within the 
EEOC charging period.379  Ledbetter’s impact has also been limited by one 
court that observed that the decision did not directly address the doctrine of 
continuing violations; rather, it dealt with discrete acts of discrimination 
whose effects were felt during the EEOC charging period.380  The Supreme 
Court’s decision in Ledbetter may be limited even more greatly, however, 
by congressional action.381 
D. THE LILLY LEDBETTER FAIR PAY ACT 
On June 22, 2007, Representative George Miller (D-CA) introduced 
the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007 in the House of Representatives.382  
The bill has ninety-three cosponsors, including North Dakota’s Representa-
tive Earl Pomeroy (D-ND).383  The bill seeks to amend Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, and the Rehabilitation 
Act of 1973.384  It most substantively amends Title VII and the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act by adding the following provision: 
For purposes of this section, an unlawful employment practice 
occurs, with respect to discrimination in compensation in violation 
of this title, when a discriminatory compensation decision or other 
practice is adopted, when an individual becomes subject to a dis-
criminatory compensation decision or other practice, or when an 
individual is affected by application of a discriminatory compen-
sation decision or other practice, including each time wages, 
 
376. See, e.g., George Wash. Univ. v. Violand, 932 A.2d 1109, 1117-18 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 
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benefits, or other compensation is paid, resulting in whole or in 
part from such a decision or other practice.385 
Thus, Congress is seeking to carry forward the discriminatory nature of 
the wage-setting decision to the subsequent issuance of paychecks, some-
thing that the Ledbetter majority refused to do.386  When asked to respond 
to this congressional action, Justice Alito, the author of the Ledbetter 
majority opinion, explained that since the Court was just interpreting the 
law Congress passed, “it’s certainly Congress’s prerogative” to change it.387  
The bill passed the House by a vote of 225-199 and is awaiting action from 
the Senate.388 
E. NORTH DAKOTA IMPACT 
North Dakota’s employment discrimination laws differ from Title VII’s 
restrictions, so the impact that Ledbetter will have on North Dakota is 
unclear.389  North Dakota’s regulations on equal pay for men and women 
are contained in North Dakota Century Code Section 34-06.1.390  The 
prohibition of gender-based pay discrimination is set forth as follows: 
No employer may discriminate between employees in the same 
establishment on the basis of gender, by paying wages to any 
employee in any occupation in this state at a rate less than the rate 
at which the employer pays any employee of the opposite gender 
for comparable work on jobs which have comparable requirements 
relating to skill, effort, and responsibility. . . .  No person may 
cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against any 
employee in violation of this chapter. No employer may discharge 
or discriminate against any employee by reason of any action 
taken by the employee to invoke or assist in any manner the 
enforcement of this chapter, except when proven that the act of the 
employee is fraudulent.391 
This chapter creates a private cause of action for employees that have 
suffered discrimination.392  It also allows the Commissioner of Labor, by 
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written request of the employee, to sue on the employee’s behalf.393  The 
Commissioner has other broad powers under this chapter, including the 
ability to inspect records, examine witnesses, eliminate unlawful practices 
“by informal methods of conference, conciliation and persuasion,” super-
vise the payment of wages, and enact regulations.394  Violation of the 
chapter is a class B misdemeanor, which brings maximum penalties of 
thirty days in jail and a $1000 fine.395  The chapter does contain a time-limit 
provision, but leaves a number of important questions unanswered.396 
The statute of limitations mandates that court action commence within 
two years of the claim for relief.397  It does not state how long an employee 
may wait to file suit after she suffers gender-based pay discrimination.398  It 
also does not answer the central question of Ledbetter: Can each paycheck 
be challenged as discriminatory, or must each discriminatory wage-setting 
decision be challenged within a certain period of time?399  The North 
Dakota Supreme Court did not answer this question in the only case in 
which it considered North Dakota Century Code Section 34-06.1-03.400  In 
Swenson v. Northern Crop Insurance, Inc.,401 the North Dakota Supreme 
Court reversed a summary judgment order against a female employee on 
her pay discrimination claim.402  The court only addressed this issue on pro-
cedural grounds, however, leaving questions about the timing and proce-
dure of filing a claim unanswered.403  Thus, while a North Dakotan that has 
been paid a discriminatorily low wage on the basis of his or her gender may 
face a more difficult road asserting a claim under Title VII after the 
Ledbetter decision, he or she may be able to achieve redress through the 
state process by appealing to the protections contained in the North Dakota 
Century Code.404 
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V. CONCLUSION 
In Ledbetter, the United States Supreme Court ruled that issuing a pay-
check based on prior discriminatory wage-setting decisions is not itself a 
discriminatory employment act.405  The discriminatory intent behind a 
previous action cannot be imputed to the nondiscriminatory issuing of a 
paycheck.406  The Court also held that a claim of gender-based pay 
discrimination under Title VII must be brought within 180 days of the 
discriminatory wage-setting decision.407  A claim that is brought more than 
180 days after the discriminatory wage-setting decision is untimely and the 
courts can offer no relief.408 
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